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Abstract
This article proposes that key CEO demographic factors reflect alternative modes of rationalizing the choice 
to engage in and/or facilitate accounting fraud. Specifically the authors theorize that younger, less functionally 
experienced CEOs and CEOs without business degrees will be more likely to rationalize accounting fraud as 
an acceptable decision. Based on a sample of 312 fraud-committing and control firms, the study finds support 
for the authors’ predictions. It also finds that CEO stock options (a form of executive equity incentive) 
also predict fraud, and that this relationship is not moderated by CEO demographics. The study thus 
extends upper echelon theory by demonstrating how key demographic variables influence CEO decisions 
to rationalize accounting fraud.
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Introduction
Accounting and financial statement fraud and chief executive officer (CEO) participation have 
long been documented. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO, 1999) report concluded that in 83 percent of fraud cases, going back to 1987, the CEO 
and/or CFO directed or was involved in the fraud. And since 1999, the involvement and indictment 
of CEOs in financial statement fraud have run rampant. Tyco lost US$100 billion in market value 
(a sum that exceeds Enron’s total loss) after it was disclosed that CEO Kozlowski had manipulated 
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earnings. Prior to the disclosure, Kozlowski quietly sold US$500 million worth of his own stock 
back to the company (Business Week, 2002). It has become increasingly common for convicted 
CEOs to receive stringent financial penalties and/or imprisonment for these crimes (New York 
Daily News, 2009). Enron’s Jeff Skilling was sentenced to over 24 years’ imprisonment as a result 
of his 2006 conviction. Bernard Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison by a federal judge 
(New York Times, 2009) joining the ranks of Richard Scrushy, Bernie Ebbers, John Rigas and 
others (New York Daily News, 2009; New York Times, 2007, 2009; Searcey and Yuan, 2005; Wall 
Street Journal, 2007).
The wealth of multidisciplinary research on financial statement fraud finds that industry and 
firm-level factors are predictors of fraud (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Daboub et al., 1995; McKendall 
and Wagner, 1997; Merton, 1938; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Sutherland, 1949; Zahra et al., 2005). 
Gross (1978) finds that it is the ‘top people’ in an organization who most often engage in illegal 
corporate activity. While these perspectives on fraud are important, there has also been a call to 
focus on a behavioral perspective of managerial elites to explain why well-intended and highly 
compensated managers may act in a particular way (Ashford and Anand, 2003; Nielson, 2009; 
Pettigrew, 1992). Prior research has associated top management team demographics with a variety 
of important firm outcomes including strategy, innovation and performance (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989; Smith et al., 1994). A few management scholars advance the notion that key individual 
demographics (e.g. age, experience, gender, education) are important to predicting top manage-
ment fraud (Greve et al., 2010; Hambrick, 2007a; Schrand and Zechman, 2010; Zahra et al., 2005, 
2007). Boone and Hendricks (2009) argue that CEOs’ preferences and knowledge account for a 
larger impact on firm outcomes than those of the top management team as a whole.
Zahra et al. (2005, 2007) theorize that individual characteristics of the CEO, such as charis-
matic leadership, age, experience level and MBA and military education moderate the rationaliza-
tion to engage in fraud. Yet, beyond the Zhang et al. (2008) study of CEO compensation and 
earning manipulation, there has been little attempt to empirically study the connection between 
individual CEO characteristics and accounting fraud. The limited empirical research attention to 
CEO demographics that may predict fraud is surprising, given the prominent role of CEO strategy 
in the literature (Ashford and Anand, 2003; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Nielson, 2009; Pettigrew, 
1992) and society’s outrage at this all-too-common phenomenon. The purpose of this article is to 
study the role of CEO demographics in accounting fraud which can contribute to improving both 
CEO selection and the governance structure designed to prevent these unlawful acts.
We draw from Zahra et al. (2005, 2007) and Hambrick (2007a) to theorize and empirically 
examine the extent to which individual CEO characteristics are associated with financial statement 
fraud. Hambrick (2007a) argues that because executives have limited information processing capa-
bilities and bounded rationality, it is useful to study their individual demographic variables because 
they serve as filters for individual interpretation of situations and the choices they make. Since 
obtaining and measuring data on an executive’s individual values and personality may not be 
possible, Hambrick (2007a) suggests the use of demographic characteristics as proxies for these 
constructs. Thus, variables such as an executive’s age, experience and educational background 
may be viewed as a way to link an executive’s strategic choice to accounting fraud.
Sociologist and criminologist Donald Cressey (1953) developed the fraud triangle to explain 
the conditions necessary for fraud to occur. The triangle suggests that for fraud to occur three 
elements must be present: opportunity, incentive/pressure (also referred to as motivation) and 
rationalization. The opportunity exists because of the CEO’s unique position as the top executive 
of the organization. The CEO possesses proprietary information about the firm’s financial 
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position, knowledge of the weaknesses in governance structure and internal controls, and is in a 
position of power and influence to override existing controls and engage in or facilitate account-
ing fraud. In the context of the CEO and financial statement fraud, motivation exists when 
the company’s financial reports affect the level of CEO financial compensation (Schrand and 
Zechman, 2010; Zhang et al., 2008).
In the presence of opportunity and motivation, a CEO will engage in fraud only if the act is 
rationalized to create the perception that financial statement fraud is justified. According to Anand 
et al. (2004) rationalizations are mental strategies that allow an individual to view normally uneth-
ical acts as justified. Rationalizations neutralize negative feelings associated with what would 
otherwise be viewed as deviant or unethical behavior. Without rationalization, cognitive disso-
nance would create a great deal of anxiety, which would force the individual to view themselves 
in an unfavorable light (Festinger, 1957). ‘Rationalization is the least observable element of the 
Fraud Triangle because it is tied to the inner thoughts and emotions of the perpetrator. The cheater 
mentally redefines their deception into a morally defensible act’ (Antenucci et al., 2010: 80). Thus 
rationalization facilitates wrongdoing as it ‘allows for the possibility that individuals termed 
corrupt by societal standards may nonetheless see themselves as ethical within the context of their 
organization’ (Anand et al., 2004: 10, 11). Holding opportunity and incentives constant, we can 
partially explain rationalization by understanding demographics. That is, older, functionally expe-
rienced CEOs with business degrees should have more difficulty rationalizing accounting fraud 
than would younger, less functionally experienced CEOs without a business degree.
While upper echelon theory explicitly argues that an individual’s values, preferences, interpre-
tation and action will be affected by his or her demographic characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), there are a number of different arguments and empirical findings in the literature about 
how demographics affect the likelihood of wrongdoing. For example Zhang et al. (2008) argued 
that long-tenured CEOs would be motivated by economic gain but also be risk adverse, and 
Schrand and Zechman (2010) suggested that more educated CEOs would, as a result of overcon-
fidence, be inclined to take risks. Because we cannot open the black box that may ultimately 
explain rationalization and why demographics predict CEO choices, we use existing arguments 
and empirical findings in the literature to generate our hypotheses about CEO demographics. One 
of the key aspects of upper echelon theory is that an individual’s values, preferences, interpreta-
tion and actions will be affected by the context in which choices occur. Hambrick noted that 
‘executives act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of the strategic situations they 
face’ (Hambrick, 2007a: 334). Understanding differences in senior executives’ perceptions and 
interpretations is of great importance, in that a CEO is not merely reporting facts, but must inter-
pret them in order to make key choices (Starbuck and Mezias, 1996). Individual interpretations 
among executives infer that their perceptions may be highly divergent.
Given that CEOs’ values, preferences and personalized interpretations work in conjunction 
with situational factors, we theorize that the relationship between CEO rationalization, as evi-
denced by demographics, and the likelihood of accounting fraud will be moderated by one form 
of equity incentives – CEO stock options. Prior research has established an association of high 
levels of CEO stock options with higher levels of financial statement fraud (Zhang et al., 2008). 
Higher levels of stock options will increase the financial motivation and rationalization of 
accounting fraud, for younger, less functionally experienced CEOs and CEOs without a business 
degree.
Our results provide new insights as to the role of the individual CEO differences which predict 
financial statement fraud as well as a glimpse into how these relationships are moderated by 
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financial incentives. This is important because we know that choices are also affected by situational 
factors but these factors have not been clearly delineated (Hambrick, 2007a). Furthermore, our 
theory on the role of stock options as a moderator can enhance the research that has found direct 
effects for stock options and accounting fraud by identifying another explanation by which stock 
options influence accounting fraud (Zhang et al., 2008).
Financial statement fraud
Financial statement fraud research has typically been explained as a deliberate rational choice to 
circumvent accounting rules and regulations for personal gain, which results in financial reports 
that are misleading or deceptive (Siegel, 1992). This fraud entails violating generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), through the overstatement of revenues, understatement of 
expenses, or overstatement of assets (Beasley et al., 2000; COSO, 1999; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Feroz et al., 1991). Sutherland (1949) suggests that criminal behavior increases as it is associated 
with favorable outcomes. Financial statement fraud has been motivated by the financial condition 
of the firm, its resources or lack of resources (COSO, 1999), by the desire to meet analysts’ earn-
ings targets (Dechow et al., 2003), or by poor corporate performance. The extant literature in 
finance finds a significant relationship between poor corporate performance and CEO dismissal 
(Ertugrul and Krishnan, 2010; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). The research on accounting fraud has 
examined the role of governance, executive compensation, the quality of accounting information, 
audits and auditors, fraud risk assessments and earnings management (Beasley, 1996; Burns and 
Kedia, 2008; Carcello and Nagy, 2004a, 2004b; Cheng and Farber, 2008; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Erickson et al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008; Laux and Laux, 2009; Prawitt et al., 2009 
Uzun et al., 2004).
Research also suggests that even if not directly involved, a CEO may direct or enable others in 
committing financial statement fraud (Ermann and Lundman, 1987), an argument also advanced 
by Zahra et al. (2005, 2007). To that end, the CEO may decide to adopt a passive and/or permis-
sive stance toward unethical conduct of subordinates, by looking ‘the other way’ (Daboub et al., 
1995; Kriesberg, 1976). When illegal activities come to light, top managers may ‘arrange patterns 
of reporting so that they cannot find out (or at least, if they find out, they find out in such a way 
that it can never be proved)’ (Stone, 1975: 53).
Thus, and consistent with fraud triangle, we theorize that a CEO has the opportunity to commit 
accounting fraud because of his or her position and knowledge at the top of the organization and 
has the motivation because of perceived personal and organization benefits. Ultimately, however, 
CEOs must rationalize the fraud as an acceptable course of action. This rationalization process 
might include CEO beliefs that ‘I can’t fail my employees and stockholders’, ‘I know we can 
make this up next quarter’, ‘just this once’, or perhaps a belief that ‘everybody does it’. The extent 
to which rational choice is influenced by the demographics of those bearing the risks and who are 
ultimately responsible, is of importance, since the consequences of detected accounting fraud can 
be severe.
Hypothesis development
In the widely cited upper echelon theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) contend that top-level stra-
tegic choices are a function of managers’ values and cognitions. Hambrick (2007a) specifically 
proposes that an individual’s values, preferences, interpretation and actions will be affected by his 
or her demographic characteristics. Social psychology literature explains values and cognitions as 
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reflections of an individual’s knowledge, together with attributions and the relationship among 
those attributes (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Prior experience and knowledge build hierarchically 
arranged categories to organize an individual’s knowledge about the world. Categories are con-
nected hierarchically from the simplest to the more complex levels of abstraction. Importantly, this 
explains differences in what people know, how they reason, and how they use their knowledge in 
a given situation. Just as Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that heterogeneous top management 
teams will bring diverse knowledge skills to a situation, we suggest that diverse executive knowl-
edge categories will bring a greater variety of knowledge to the situation.
Our hypotheses focus on three CEO demographics – age, functional experience and education. 
Variation among CEOs in these demographic areas reflects disparity in the structure of individual 
knowledge. Specifically, older CEOs are expected to have a greater amount of knowledge and a 
wider range of different types of knowledge about themselves and the world in which they live. 
Further, CEOs with a diverse set of functional experiences within the firm will have broader and 
deeper sets of hierarchical categories than a CEO with less functional experience. In addition, 
education can represent differences in knowledge categories (Fong et al., 1986), such that CEOs 
with business degrees may attain and retain more knowledge about accounting and business law 
than managers without such education. Finally, we theorize that how a CEO rationalizes accounting 
fraud will be moderated by financial incentives, as incentives will affect the level of motivation.
Executive age
Executive age has been empirically connected to cognitive development and awareness (Daboub 
et al., 1995). Researchers found negative relationships between age and Machiavellian behaviors 
(Hunt and Chonko, 1984) and unethical behaviors (Kelley et al., 1990). Age impacts strategy 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) due in part to the impact of life experiences (Ireland et al., 1987). 
Shuman and Scott (1989) concluded that the events experienced during youth were important to 
attitudes developed in later years.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that younger executives undertake riskier strategies, 
perhaps alluding to the ‘follies of youth’. In support, Markóczy (1997) found that younger manag-
ers are greater risk-takers, and Brouthers et al. (2000: 867, 876) reported that younger managers are 
more ‘strategically aggressive’ than older managers, especially during times of turbulence. In a 
study of white-collar crime, Price and Norris (2009) reported that younger managers are more 
vulnerable to societal and organizational pressures. In contrast, Hambrick and Mason (1984) con-
tend that older executives are more conservative, possibly because they are better able to judge 
risks and negative consequences. Older managers are less likely to challenge the rules within an 
organization (Child, 1974). Kelley et al. (1990) assert that maturity is associated with higher levels 
of moral development and older employees have stricter interpretations of their firm’s ethical 
standards of conduct (Serwinek, 1992). Older executives are less likely to yield to industry and 
organizational pressures (Daboub et al., 1995) and according to Price and Norris (2009) greater age 
serves as a protective factor against these pressures.
The risk encountered with accounting fraud is that it will be discovered. The repercussions of 
getting caught committing or facilitating financial statement fraud can be devastating. Even when 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not impose sanctions on the individuals 
in the firm responsible for these acts, there are individual reputational costs that the market 
imposes on the individuals who are associated with these crimes. As a consequence of the broad 
set of experiences and maturity that comes with age, an older CEO is more likely to view the 
results of rationalizing financial statement fraud as being too costly.
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Following Reynolds (2006), we theorize that older executives will have acquired a more 
developed knowledge base to make choices than will younger CEOs and that with age there will 
be more structure, leading to more efficiency and accuracy (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). As such, an 
older executive will have a more difficult time rationalizing accounting fraud than will a younger 
executive. Following this logic, we predict:
Hypothesis 1: Younger CEOs are more likely to engage in or facilitate accounting fraud.
Executive functional experience
Functional background has been utilized as a knowledge-based individual difference in prior 
research (Boone and Hendricks, 2009) and it has been linked to variation in CEO strategic choices 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Herrmann, 2002) as well as executive management’s perceptions and 
interpretations of problems (Starbuck and Mezias, 1996). Variations in functional experience 
reflect a range of knowledge categories that a CEO uses to rationalize choices. A more diverse 
range of categories allows the CEO to draw upon more and different types of information. CEOs 
with a greater breadth of functional experience should exhibit greater self-regulation abilities and 
more refined cognitive processing (Glaser, 1984). Furthermore, with knowledge organized into a 
broader set of categories and these categories connected in complex and hierarchical patterns, 
functionally experienced CEOs will have a greater amount and variety of knowledge to draw upon. 
Child (1974) claimed less experienced managers may lack knowledge of key principles to guide 
choices, unable to consider as many alternatives since they have a smaller range of knowledge 
categories to draw upon. Because of a narrower set of knowledge categories they will have limited 
information processing capabilities compared to those CEOs with diverse functional experience. 
This naiveté or illusion of control, favorability, or optimism (Messick and Bazerman, 1996) may 
mean that less experienced CEOs will more easily rationalize accounting fraud.
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) suggest that functional experience reflects an executive’s 
breadth of knowledge. Functional specialization results in executives approaching problems from 
the perspective(s) that is (are) common to that particular function (Gupta, 1984). Herrmann (2002) 
suggests that the greater the number of various perspectives and functional experiences that the 
executive has been exposed to, the broader base of alternatives and solutions the CEO can consider. 
Those executives who have greater exposure to different functions in their organization will have 
a greater opportunity to learn and develop their knowledge base as it relates to their particular 
company and its customers, markets, financing and so on. Thus, breadth of functional experience 
should be accompanied by a wider range of knowledge categories with executives who have more 
functional experience less likely to rationalize accounting fraud (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Zhang et al., 2008). Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: CEOs with fewer in-firm functional experiences are more likely to engage in or 
facilitate accounting fraud.
Executive business education
Chief executive officers are generally well educated, with most having completed college (Chandy, 
1991; Palia, 2000). According to cognitive theory, education is positively related to cognitive 
abilities (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and more highly educated executives are better able to 
generate novel and creative solutions to various problems (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) suggest that education can influence strategic choices within organizations. 
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Higher levels of CEO education are associated with greater innovation (Grimm and Smith, 1991) 
and advanced ability to process and integrate information (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). The level 
of education has also been shown to have a positive relationship to the level of moral development 
(Freeman and Gilbert, 1988; Rest and Thoma, 1985). Research in social cognition supports the 
notion that education improves decision-making (Fisk and Taylor, 1991; Fong et al., 1986; Lehman 
et al., 1988).
Business education also impacts executive rationalization. Daboub et al. (1995) theorized that 
graduate business education is associated with greater self-interested behavior and they predict that 
executives with MBAs would be more likely to be involved in corporate illegal activity. Critics of 
business education suggest that the focus of the curriculum is directed at increasing profits at the 
expense of teaching ethics and values (Gioia, 2002; Gioia and Corley, 2002; Pfeffer and Fong 
2004). An Aspen Institute study (2001) suggested that a business school education actually weak-
ened the moral character of these graduates. Gioia (2002) attributes the crisis in corporate confi-
dence to the focus on hard business courses, such as accounting, finance, and not injecting ethics 
and values into the curriculums.
Conversely, Barker and Mueller (2002) report that the analytic skills which are taught in busi-
ness schools tend to be geared toward avoiding big mistakes or losses. This conservative outlook 
may evoke a more rational and systematic approach to business choices, that is, education in busi-
ness may help to develop skills that are used to distinguish between good strategic choices with 
acceptable payoffs and actions that are potentially costly mistakes. Business education not only 
engenders improved ability to integrate and analyze information, but it may also train managers to 
reject those actions and behaviors that are associated with negative consequences.
Business education, when there is a focus on profits at any cost, may lead to greater likelihood 
of rationalizing accounting fraud. But the preponderance of literature indicates that higher educa-
tion in general is associated with more refined decision-making. Given this dichotomy, we postu-
late that CEOs schooled in business administration will be more aware of the fundamentals of 
accounting, including the related subjects of business processes and internal controls, the monitor-
ing role of the board of directors and the potential repercussions and penalties of unethical behav-
ior. Thus we assert that CEOs with a business education will be less likely to rationalize accounting 
fraud:
Hypothesis 3: CEOs who have earned a business degree are less likely to engage in or facilitate 
accounting fraud.
The moderating effects of CEO stock options on the 
relationship between CEO demographics and accounting fraud
Hambrick’s (2007a) upper echelon framework calls for more study on the interactive effects of 
executive demographics with context situations such as executive equity incentives. For example, 
he notes: ‘Research in the upper echelons vein indicates that executive characteristics influence 
strategic outcomes. A separate body of literature demonstrates that executive rewards systems 
affect company behaviors’ (Hambrick, 2007a: 339). The extant research that examines executive 
demographics and compensation in tandem (Hambrick, 2007a) is minimal. Given that a large part 
of a CEO’s compensation is equity based, we study the impact of CEO stock options, which have 
been empirically linked to accounting fraud (Zhang et al., 2008), on the relationship between CEO 
demographics and the likelihood of accounting fraud. We argue that stock options will affect the 
level of CEO motivation.
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Executive stock options
The pay packages of today’s executives generally include a significant component of stock options 
that increase in value as goals, earnings or growth targets, or stock-price targets are met (Hall and 
Murphy, 2002). DeFusco et al. (1990) and Brockman et al. (2010) found that executives that hold 
stock options undertake more risky opportunities. The agency literature posits that incentives are a 
way to align the agent’s and the firm’s interests (Jensen, 2001; Tosi et al., 2000), but Uzun et al. 
(2004) and Zhang et al. (2008) also report that ‘lucrative’ stock options play a role in corporate 
malfeasance.
A broad swath of research on executive stock options concludes that CEO stock options provide 
incentives for fraudulent acts by executives (Beasley et al., 2001; Jensen, 2001; O’Connor et al., 
2006 Tosi et al., 2000; Uzun et al., 2004). Given the significant amount of research on the stock 
option–fraud relationship, we study the extent to which the relationship between CEOs’ stock 
options will attenuate the CEO demographics–fraud relationship. Specifically, following the logic 
of the first three hypotheses, we theorize that CEOs with a more complex and developed knowl-
edge base measured as older, functionally experienced and business educated CEOs would be less 
influenced by the presence of high levels of stock options.
We have asserted that an older CEO will have multifaceted knowledge categories and have 
developed a more hierarchical knowledge base to draw from than will a younger CEO. Because 
of this we suggest that an older CEO would be less likely to rationalize accounting fraud than 
younger CEOs. Older CEOs, with complex, developed and perhaps better knowledge of the busi-
ness world should be better able to understand and manage the pressures that accompany stock 
option incentives. In other words, given the same level of stock options, older CEOs would be 
less likely to rationalize accounting fraud than would younger CEOs. In essence, with more 
knowledge to draw upon, these CEOs would be more aware of and understand the ways that stock 
options can lead to unacceptable rationalization. Younger CEOs may be more aggressive in order 
to enhance their wealth (Brouthers et al., 2000; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990) and more 
likely to rationalize as a normal part of business. Therefore, we expect that younger managers will 
be more likely to succumb to the pressures and be motivated by the financial gain of stock options 
than will older managers.
As noted, CEOs with broad functional experience will have a wider set of knowledge catego-
ries to draw upon, to discern the impact of a choice on the firm and the firm’s functional seg-
ments. As Fiske and Taylor (1991) note, life experiences, both negative and positive, influence 
the complexity, accessibility and content of choices. As in the case of age, a CEO with a broad set 
of functional experiences and knowledge should be better able to realize and manage the pres-
sures associated with stock options as compared to a CEO with a narrow range of experiences. 
With more functional experience, CEOs will be more confident in their actions (Child, 1974) and 
they will sense negative business events as less intimidating (Dunn, 2004).
Finally, a CEO with a business education should be more aware of and more capable of 
managing the influence of stock options toward the commitment of accounting fraud than CEOs 
without such education. CEOs with a business degree would be more likely to realize the long-
term positive potential of stock options in building real corporate wealth and be less compelled 
by demands for short-term performance gains (e.g. Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2010). CEOs with-
out a business degree may not realize or know the importance of building real long-term corpo-
rate wealth in the same way as CEOs with a business degree. Given the same level of stock 
options, business-educated CEOs will be less likely to rationalize accounting fraud as acceptable. 
Thus we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 4: The relationship between CEO demographics and the likelihood of accounting 
fraud will be moderated by the level of stock options, such that older, more functionally experi-
enced CEOs who hold a business degree will be less influenced by high levels of stock options than 
will younger, less functionally experienced CEOs who do not hold a business degree.
Methodology
Sample selection
The sample of fraud firms was taken from the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs) for violating the financial reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934. This Act requires publicly traded firms to file financial reports with the SEC that must be in 
compliance with GAAP (see Dechow et al., 1996). Using AAERs as our source of sample firms 
provides us with a sample of firms that purposefully engaged in accounting violations (Beasley, 
1996; Dechow et al., 1996). To identify the firms in our fraud sample, we analyzed the SEC 
enforcement actions issued from 1992 to 2005. Because of a change in compensation disclosure 
rules by the SEC, many companies, though not all, began disclosing standardized and detailed 
compensation data in 1992 (Stone, 1992). A firm was included in the sample if the necessary proxy 
and financial statement data were available for the fiscal year prior to the year the SEC enforce-
ment action indicated the fraud started. As a result, we have 156 fraud firms in our sample where 
the fraud started between 1992 and 2004, there was either a guilty verdict in a criminal case or 
consent to the order or judgment imposed by the SEC, and for which there were complete data 
available.
Following prior research (see, for example, Beasley, 1996; Carcello and Nagy, 2004a, 2004b; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Kaminski et al., 2004; Uzun et al., 2004), a central part of our research 
design was to identify a control firm, not subject to SEC enforcement action, for each violator in 
the sample that closely resembled the fraud firm in terms of industry and size. In order to maxi-
mize the likelihood of using uncontaminated or clean data we selected the company in the indus-
try that was closest in size based on total assets, using data from the year prior to the start of the 
fraud, to the fraud firm, based on the three- or four-digit SIC industry code (Beasley, 1996; 
Carcello and Nagy, 2004a, 2004b; Dechow et al., 1996; Uzun et al., 2004). To minimize the pos-
sibility that the control firm was not also engaging in or suspected of accounting irregularities, 
we conducted a search of press articles on Lexis-Nexis and the Business and Company Resource 
Center for reports of alleged unacceptable accounting practices in the sample of control firms. 
We found no reports of alleged accounting malfeasance for the companies in the final sample of 
control firms.
The entire sample consists of 312 publicly traded companies. Half or 156 of the firms, i.e. the 
fraud firms, were subject to SEC enforcement action and the other half were a sample of control 
firms. The firms studied come from 43 different industries, as measured by two-digit SIC codes, 
and therefore represent a broad cross-section of the business environment.
Data sources
All data were collected from the following publicly available sources: (1) Compustat; (2) SEC fil-
ings, including company DEF-14A (proxy statements) and company 10-K reports; (3) Dun and 
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Managements; and (4) the Center for Research and 
Security Prices (CRSP) database.
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Description of variables
Dependent variable. In our outcome equation the dependent variable is accounting fraud and meas-
ured as a 1–0 dichotomous variable with 1 indicating that the firm was subject to SEC enforcement 
action for accounting violations and 0 indicating that the firm was in the sample of control firms.
Independent variables. CEO age is measured at the beginning of the year the fraud started, as 
reported in company DEF-14A (proxy) statements, company 10-K reports and from the Lexis-
Nexis Academic Biographical Directories. CEO former functional positions is the number of func-
tional/executive positions that the CEO held in the firm prior to becoming the CEO. Data on the 
number of CEO functional positions were collected from company DEF-14A (proxy) statements, 
company 10-K reports and from the Lexis-Nexis Academic Biographical Directories. CEO 
business degree is a 1–0 dichotomous variable, equal to 1 if the CEO has an undergraduate or 
graduate degree in business and 0, otherwise. This information was gathered from company DEF-
14A (proxy) statements, company 10-K reports and from the Lexis-Nexis AcademicBiographical 
Directories. CEO stock options is measured as the total value of the CEO’s unexercised options 
divided by total compensation, all data taken from the year prior to the start of the fraud. When the 
fraud began in the CEO’s first year, we used options and compensation data from that year. CEO 
stock options data were collected from company proxy statements.
Control variables. Following prior research we include measures of governance, industry, year, 
financial condition and firm size as control variables. These controls are added in order to address 
problems related to the potential threat of alternative explanations. Our governance variables are 
CEO stock ownership, CEO duality, board size and number of outside directors. Stock ownership 
as Morck et al. (1990: 32) proposed, ‘may be the most effective deterrent to investments that dis-
sipate market value’. This variable is computed as the percentage of outstanding company stock 
beneficially owned by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding for the company 
(Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Duality is a 1–0 variable, with 1 indicating that in the year the fraud 
began, the CEO was also chairman of the board, and 0, otherwise. Board size and outside directors 
are measured as the total number of directors and the number of non-employee directors, respec-
tively, on the company’s board of directors. Data for these governance variables were gathered 
from company proxy statements.
To control for potential underlying industry effects resulting from industry-specific considera-
tions (Erickson et al., 2006), including the possibility that the SEC may at times spotlight a particu-
lar industry to investigate, each firm was classified according to industry. Similarly to Ning et al. 
(2007) we based our classification on the following industry categories: construction (SIC 15–17); 
manufacturing (SIC 20–39); transportation, communication and energy (SIC 40–49); wholesale 
and retail trade (SIC 50–59); finance, insurance and real estate (SIC 60–67); services (SIC 70–89); 
and other industries (SICs 01–14 and 90–99). We also control for the time period using dummy 
variables for the year the fraud began, as reported by the SEC.
‘Fraudulent financial reporting has traditionally been associated with companies experiencing 
financial difficulties’ (Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
1987: 159). We use Altman’s (1968) Z-score (a measure of financial distress), return on assets 
(ROA) and book-to-market value to measure and control for firm financial condition. Return on 
assets is measured as operating income scaled by average total assets. Book-to-market value, an 
indicator of firm value, is measured as the book value of company equity divided by market capi-
talization. Lastly, firm size is measured as the natural log of total assets (Carcello and Nagy, 2004a, 
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2004b). Z-score, ROA, book-to-market value and firm size data were collected from Compustat at 
the balance sheet date for the year prior to the start of the accounting fraud.
Heckman correction and research model
Of interest in this research is the relationship between CEO incentives and accounting fraud. To 
test our hypotheses we use a Heckman two-step procedure1 to correct for possible selection bias 
related to incentives, particularly stock options granted to and held by the CEO. In the first step, 
the selection equation, we followed Lee (1983) and Smits (2003) and employed a logistic regres-
sion to estimate predicted values of the model. These predicted values are then used to calculate 
lambda, also known as the inverse Mills ratio or correction factor (Bascle, 2008). In the selection 
equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is reported to have unex-
ercised stock options, 0 otherwise. As is necessary, this indicator variable is not correlated with 
accounting fraud, but is correlated with our measure of CEO stock options. The second step, 
referred to as the outcome equation (Bascle, 2008) is our regression of interest. In the outcome 
equation a probit regression model is used to test the relation between the independent variables, 
defined below, and dependent variable: the occurrences of accounting fraud. A probit regression is 
a useful model for our substantial analysis because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable, accounting fraud. In addition to the independent and control variables that are included in 
the selection (first) equation, the outcome equation contains two additional variables, CEO stock 
options and the lambda, determined from the first equation. ‘The coefficient of λ indicates whether 
there is selection bias and what the direction of this bias is’ (Smits, 2003: 9).
Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. Table 2 reports the results of 
the probit regression analysis with Heckman’s correction. The main effects model provides good 
explanatory power for accounting fraud (χ2 = 337.832; p = .010). The coefficient for lambda is 
positive, but not significant, implying that selection bias is not empirically relevant.
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 address the relationship between the CEO demographic variables of age, 
in-firm functional experience and business education with accounting fraud. We expected to find 
that younger CEOs, CEOs with fewer functional positions in the company prior to becoming the 
firm’s top executive and CEOs who did not have a business degree would be associated with 
greater likelihood of financial statement fraud. As expected, the coefficients of these demographic 
variables are negative and significant. Thus our hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are supported. The CEOs of 
the fraud firms were more likely, on average, to be younger (β = –.027; p < .01), have fewer func-
tional experiences within the company (β = –.329; p < .001) and less likely to have a business 
degree (β = –.573; p = .001).
The CEOs of the violator firms were, on average about 2.3 years younger than the CEOs of the 
control firms, a statistically significant difference (t-test = –2.435; p < .05). The CEOs of the fraud 
firms also held significantly fewer function positions in the firm prior to becoming CEO than did 
the CEOs of the control firms. On average the CEOs of the fraud firms had held on average 1.46 
functional positions in the firm prior to becoming CEO, while the CEOs of the control firms held 
nearly two (1.94) functional positions in the company, a significant difference (t-test = –3.923; 
p < .001). The CEOs of the fraud firms were also significantly less likely to have a business degree. 
Forty of the fraud firms (25.6 percent) had CEOs who had a business degree, while 65 of the 
control firms (41.7 percent) had CEOs with a business degree (χ2 = 8.972; p < .01).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations matrix
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 1 Fraud .50 .50 1.00
 2 CEO age 52.17 8.93 −.13* 1.00
 3  CEO 
experience
1.70 1.39 −.18**−.05 1.00
 4  CEO business 
degree
.34 .47 −.17**−.08 .17** 1.00
 5  CEO stock 
options
6.43 15.33 .13* −.01 .21** .04 1.00
 6  CEO stock 
ownership
.10 .14 −.04 .06 −.16** −.06 −.13* 1.00
 7 Duality .65 .48 −.01 .18** −.11 .04 .07 .20** 1.00
 8 Indus SIC 15−17 .02 .14 .00 .16** .03 .00 −.05 .09 .05 1.00
 9 Indus SIC 20−39 .41 .49 −.01 .19** −.02 −.05 .03 −.04 .02 −.12* 1.00
10 Indus SIC 40−49 .06 .23 .00 .07 .00 −.06 −.02 −.05 .04 −.04 −.21** 1.00
11 Indus SIC 50−51 .07 .26 .00 −.07 .00 .02 −.08 −.04 −.14* −.04 −.23** −.07 1.00
12 Indus SIC 52−59 .10 .30 .00 −.04 .01 −.05 −.03 .03 .03 −.05 −.27** −.08 −.09 1.00
13 Indus SIC 60−67 .01 .11 .00 .07 −.12* −.08 −.04 −.02 .02 −.02 −.10 −.03 −.03 −.04
14 Indus SIC 70−88 .29 .46 .00 −.23** .05 .15** .08 −.02 .00 −.09 −.54** −.16** −.18** −.21**
15 1992 .08 .28 .00 −.02 −.29** −.12* −.10 −.02 −.02 −.04 −.11* .03 .01 .22**
16 1993 .08 .28 .00 −.02 −.21** −.09 −.09 .00 .05 −.04 .08 −.08 −.08 −.02
17 1994 .04 .19 .00 −.03 −.16** −.11 −.04 .15** .01 −.03 −.03 −.05 −.06 .16**
18 1995 .03 .18 .00 −.02 −.16** −.09 −.05 .03 −.02 −.03 −.01 −.05 −.05 −.06
19 1996 .07 .26 .00 .22** −.16** −.04 −.06 .03 −.01 .14* .18** −.07 .02 −.09
20 1997 .03 .18 .00 .00 −.18** −.01 −.05 −.04 .02 −.03 .14* −.05 .09 −.06
21 1998 .17 .37 .00 −.02 .14* .05 .00 −.06 .02 .06 −.06 .18** .01 −.03
22 1999 .19 .40 .00 −.14* .22** .08 .18** .01 .03 −.07 −.01 −.05 −.07 −.05
23 2000 .14 .35 .01 .03 .26** .06 .11 −.03 .01 .08 .06 .06 −.04 −.01
24 2001 .09 .29 .00 .01 .13* .13* −.02 −.05 −.10 −.04 −.22** .02 .26** −.03
25 2002 .05 .21 −.02 .05 −.03 −.03 −.05 .06 .01 −.03 .02 −.06 −.06 .03
26 Z score 1.28 1.40 −.05 .06 .01 .02 −.07 .02 .01 .00 .00 −.05 .24** .16**
27 ROA −.01 .41 .08 .06 .05 −.02 .09 .01 .09 .02 −.06 .03 .05 .04
28 Book-to-market .57 .71 −.05 .12* −.09 −.09 −.21** .21** −.05 .08 −.08 .01 .07 −.04
29 LN total assets 4.90 2.22 .05 .11* .23** .04 .23** −.29** .15** −.01 −.09 .18** .01 .14*
30 Board size 7.26 2.80 −.04 .19** .12* .07 .09 −.28** .02 −.01 .00 .18** .02 .08
31  Outside 
directors
4.49 2.62 −.11* .09 .21** .06 .15** −.33** .01 −.03 −.02 .18** .05 .05
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−.07 1.00  
.17** −.04 1.00  
−.03 .06 −.09 1.00  
−.02 −.13* −.06 −.06 1.00  
−.02 .12* −.06 −.06 −.04 1.00  
.19** −.18** −.08 −.08 −.06 −.05 1.00  
−.02 −.12* −.06 −.06 −.04 −.03 −.05 1.00  
−.05 −.10 −.14* −.14* −.09 −.08 −.12* −.08 1.00  
−.06 .18** −.15** −.15** −.10 −.09 −.13* −.09 −.22** 1.00  
−.05 −.07 −.12* −.12* −.08 −.08 −.11* −.08 −.18** −.20** 1.00  
−.04 .14* −.10 −.10 −.06 −.06 −.09 −.06 −.14* −.15** −.13* 1.00  
−.03 .05 −.07 −.07 −.05 −.04 −.06 −.04 −.10 −.11 −.09 −.07 1.00  
−.03 −.17** .05 .00 −.03 −.06 −.05 −.01 .10 −.04 −.04 .09 −.02 1.00  
.04 −.03 .04 .02 .00 .03 .04 −.05 .06 .07 −.04 .02 −.09 .24** 1.00  
−.03 −.03 −.05 .01 .19** .04 .08 −.01 −.08 −.07 −.03 .05 .05 −.04 .04 1.00  
.00 −.09 −.02 −.10 −.09 −.04 −.07 −.04 .05 .05 .09 .04 .04 .09 .40** −.04 1.00  
.11* −.17** .04 .00 −.09 −.12* −.11* −.02 .07 .00 −.02 .12* .05 .07 .14* −.06 .60* 1.00
−.02 −.08 .01 −.11 −.06 −.11 −.14* −.02 −.02 .04 .05 .17** .11* .07 .14* −.05 .57* .79*
N = 312.
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Our fourth hypothesis conjectures that the relationship between CEO demographics and the 
likelihood of accounting fraud will be moderated by the level of stock options. Based on Zahra et 
al. (2005, 2007) we expected to find that older, more functionally experienced CEOs and those 
who hold a business degree would be less influenced by high levels of stock options than would 
younger, less functionally experienced CEOs and those not having a business degree, and would, 
therefore, reduce even further the likelihood of accounting fraud. This hypothesis is not supported 
by our data. As will be discussed, we carried out a number of robustness tests to examine alterna-
tive explanations of the results. These robustness checks support our findings reported above.
Discussion
This research examined the relationship between key CEO demographics and accounting fraud. 
Responding to a call for more empirical study of the behavioral perspectives of corporate elites 
(Pettigrew, 1992), we develop theory from cognitive psychology and specifically from the study of 
rationalizations (e.g. cognitions, perceptions and interpretations) to advance upper echelon theory 
(Hambrick, 2007a). We utilize the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) and the framework of top man-
agement fraud (Zahra et al., 2007) to conceptualize our study of who is more likely to rationalize 
the facilitation of financial statement fraud. Our goal was to aid in understanding of executive 
rationalizations needed to justify unethical behavior. As suggested by Hambrick (2007a) key indi-
vidual differences, measured using individual demographics (e.g. age, functional experience and 
business education), are effective surrogates for CEO values, cognitions, perceptions and interpre-
tations, and may be used to predict the rationalization of financial statement fraud by the CEO. In 
particular, we focus on the ‘individual key actor’ of the firm as opposed to the management team. 
Understanding how and why variation in individual CEOs’ demographics predicts fraudulent acts 
is important given the continued involvement of CEOs in financial statement fraud.
Our specific contribution is to advance the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) by suggesting how variations in CEO demographic variables are related to cognitive inter-
pretations and perceptions and result in the rationalization of accounting fraud. As noted, it has 
been accepted that demographics relate to differences in cognition and knowledge, but how these 
demographics relate to cognition and knowledge has not been delineated. In addition, the nega-
tive direct effect of stock options on CEO fraud is well cataloged. In this regard, we examine how 
stock options moderate the relationship between CEO demography and the likelihood of account-
ing fraud.
While we cannot directly measure the CEO’s values and perceptions, nor are we able to evalu-
ate his/her cognitions, interpretations or perceptions, we use key demographic characteristics as 
surrogates for executive rationalization (Hambrick, 2007a), which is impacted by differences in 
perceptions and interpretations (Starbuck and Mezias, 1996). We propose that cognitions, percep-
tions and interpretations will differ with CEO demographics. In turn, we suggest that these vari-
ations will influence the CEO and therefore affect CEO rationalization.
Our analysis was conducted using a Heckman procedure to correct for selection bias. Our 
regression model includes a broad set of controls suggested in the literature – industry, firm size, 
financial condition, time and governance. We find the relationships between the key CEO demo-
graphics of age, experience and education, and accounting fraud are negative and significant. The 
results of the regression model support our hypotheses 1, 2 and 3: that CEOs who are younger, 
have had fewer in-firm functional positions prior to becoming CEO and do not have a business 
degree are more likely to commit accounting fraud than their older, more functionally experi-
enced counterparts who have business degrees. Although options predict fraud, the results of our 
Troy et al. 275
regression model interactions do not provide support for our fourth hypothesis that high amounts 
of CEO stock options moderate the relationship between CEO demographics and the likelihood 
of accounting fraud.
We ran several additional models (results not reported) that used different indicator variables2 
for Heckman’s correction and also conducted our analysis using two additional measures of CEO 
stock options: the Black–Scholes value and the value of the exercisable options, both as reported 
in the company proxy statements. In each case the results are consistent with those reported in 
Table 2; the coefficients for the CEO demographic variables are negative and significant and none 
of the interactions of CEO demographic variables with CEO stock options are statistically signifi-
cant. In this respect our results are robust. In the context of rationalization, we do not find that 
higher levels of CEO stock options make a significant impact on the direct effects relationship of 
CEO demographics and accounting fraud.
In terms of practical interpretations of our results, Schwab et al. (2010) show that null-hypoth-
esis testing has its challenges, including the difficulty to interpret and understand the results. 
What does it mean that the CEOs of the fraud firms were significantly younger than the CEOs of 
the control firms, when the average age difference is 2.3 years? There is not much that is practi-
cally useful in such a minor difference in the average age. Nevertheless, it is helpful to examine 
the overall age levels of the two groups, which shows that the fraud firms had more CEOs that 
were in their thirties or early forties and fewer CEOs that were over 60 or 65 than the control 
firms. For the fraud firms, 48 (30.8 percent) of the CEOs were aged 45 or younger, as compared 
to 29 (18.6 percent) of the CEOs in the control firms. In the fraud firms 25 (16.0 percent) of the 
CEOs had reached age 60 as opposed to 36 (23 percent) for CEOs in the control firms. Only 7 (4.4 
percent) CEOs were age 65 or above in the fraud firms while 15 (9.6 percent) of the CEOs in the 
control had reached age 65 or higher.
Why would age directly impact the top executive’s rationalization of fraud? As suggested by 
prior literature (see, for example, Daboub et al., 1995), younger CEOs are more risk tolerant and 
more vulnerable to external pressure. Conversely, older CEOs, with their higher levels of cogni-
tive development, greater awareness and more life experiences, may not rationalize the fraud, 
given the perceived risks of fines, reputation and imprisonment if caught. Since our fraud firms’ 
CEOs are, on average, further away from retirement and have not had as long to develop their 
reputation as an executive, we speculate that age explains to some extent the rationalization and 
participation in fraud as evidenced by the finding in our study that younger CEOs are more likely 
to engage in fraud.
The CEOs of the fraud firms held on average 1.46 in-firm functional positions prior to becom-
ing CEO, while the CEOs of the control firms on average held nearly two (1.94) in-firm functional 
positions prior to becoming CEO. The breadth of in-firm experience becomes more evident when 
examining the data for CEOs with no functional experience in the firm. In the fraud firms, 54 (37.2 
percent) of CEOs had no prior functional experience in the firm compared to 36 (23.1 percent) of 
the CEOs in the control firms. Why would lower in-firm functional experience directly impact the 
top executive’s rationalization of fraud? One plausible explanation is that fraud firms may be more 
likely to have a CEO that was not promoted from within the company. It is not uncommon to bring 
in an outsider, particularly if the firm’s performance is declining. Thus, a CEO may have been 
hired for fresh ideas or to turn the company around. This CEO may be viewed as an expert or 
turnaround champion, and rationalize his/her actions accordingly. Although additional research is 
necessary, our results imply that the breadth of in-firm functional experience is an important fraud 
variable. Whether career functional experience has a different or even stronger impact than in-firm 
experience, or the type of in-firm experience matters, is a topic for future research.
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The CEOs of the fraud firms were also less likely to have had business education. Business 
education, which we define as an undergraduate or graduate degree in one of the traditional busi-
ness areas, such as management, accounting, finance and marketing, provides an awareness of 
what encompasses accepted financial reporting and ethical business practices. We theorized that 
CEOs with business education may acquire greater knowledge of accounting and financial skills. 
Although Daboub et al. (1995) theorized that business executives would be more likely to commit 
illegal activities, they did not empirically study the question. Our results suggest that business 
education reduces rationalization, as it relates to accounting fraud. For the firms in our study, 
CEOs with business degrees at the tertiary level are more likely to head firms that are not engaging 
in financial statement fraud. Further research is needed to explore the specific factors or charac-
teristics of business school curriculums that explains these results.
Surprisingly, we found no support for our fourth hypothesis: that high CEO stock options mod-
erate the relationship between CEO functional experience and the likelihood of accounting fraud 
and stock options also moderate the relationship between CEO business education and the likeli-
hood of accounting fraud. Our results suggest that the relationship between stock options and 
accounting fraud is less complex than previously theorized and that the relationship between stock 
options and accounting fraud is direct. One leg of Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle is motivation. 
We have assumed that CEO stock options provide a motivation for accounting fraud and our main 
effects model, which includes CEO stock options as an independent variable, supports our posi-
tion. CEO stock options are positively and significantly associated with accounting fraud. We 
interpret the lack of significance of the interactions of CEO stock options and CEO demographic 
variables to mean that rationalization for accounting fraud is not exacerbated just because the 
CEO holds a proportionally large amount of stock options. Lack of significance does not neces-
sarily translate to lack of importance (Schwab et al., 2010). The demographic variables in our 
study, particularly experience and business education, are negatively associated with accounting 
fraud. A greater likelihood of fraud is the result of less CEO experience or no business education. 
High levels of CEO stock options are also associated with greater likelihood of fraud, but do not 
make the likelihood any greater than it already is, given the CEO demographics. Stated differently, 
CEO demographics do not have any significant impact on the likelihood of fraud, given that a 
CEO with high levels of stock options is more likely to engage in fraud.3
While the results of this study are important, there are some limitations. Our empirical results 
are generally supportive of our theory, though we cannot confirm that the underlying theory we 
develop actually explains our results. That is, we cannot confirm that the black box of rationaliza-
tion of accounting fraud is what is measured by demographics. It is difficult to fully explain why 
demographics matter in the way they do as prior research has found. The insights that we have 
developed are interesting, but like most other demographic studies, we are making conjectures 
about CEOs’ cognitions, perceptions and interpretations that influence the rationalization of 
accounting fraud. Future research might better advance the question of demographics, if data that 
are more directly measures of cognitions and rationalizations become available and accessible. 
Limitations relating to the empirical aspects of our research also exist. By taking our sample from 
firms sanctioned by the SEC, we acknowledge the potential for some bias as a result of the process 
the SEC uses to select firms to investigate. Using the SEC enforcement actions for our initial 
sample selection provides as pure a sample as is possible of firms engaging in accounting fraud 
and is consistent with prior research on fraud (e.g. Beasley et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1996; Feroz 
et al., 1991). Our research covers a period of 13 years from 1992 to 2004, and, while we have 
controlled for time in our model, Kaminski et al. (2004: 26) note that ‘results in changing condi-
tions within the sample period . . . can also impact the model data and the prediction period’.
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In conclusion, we began this article acknowledging the continuing problem of CEO fraud. We 
approach financial statement fraud from the perspective of the key influencer of the firm, focusing 
on CEO individual demographics as proxies for cognition, perceptions and interpretations as a 
way to explain why some CEOs rationalize the facilitation of accounting fraud and others do not. 
The results of our study contribute to Hambrick’s (2007a, 2007b) upper echelons framework by 
suggesting how variation in CEO demography leads to variation in cognitive interpretations, 
which in turn impacts the likelihood of accounting fraud. While encouraged by the results of our 
study, we acknowledge the need for additional research to investigate further the relationships 
between demographics, cognitions, rationalization and accounting fraud, and interactions with 
previously established variables which have been linked to CEO fraud.
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Notes
1. See Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), Bascle (2008) and Smits (2003) for detailed explanations of the 
Heckman procedure.
2. These other indicator variables were related to governance (dichotomous variable = 1, if majority of 
board members were insiders and 0, otherwise); firm size (large vs medium/small) and incentive compen-
sation (existence of current stock option awards and exercisable options).
3. We also explored a variety of other governance moderation variables (duality, founder, board outsiders) as 
these also may affect the CEO’s opportunity to engage in accounting fraud. Using Heckman’s correction, 
we found a direct negative effect for the number of outside board members, controlling for total board 
members. However, the number of outside board members did not moderate the CEO demographic fraud 
relationship.
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